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Abstract 
 
 
 
In recent years, economists and other social scientists have devoted extensive research efforts to 
understanding the widening wage gap between high-skill and low-skill workers.  This paper 
focuses on a slightly different question: how has globalization affected the relative share of 
income going to capital and labor? Using a panel of over one hundred countries, this paper 
analyses trends in labor shares and examines the relationship between shares and measures of 
globalization.  Contrary to recent literature, the evidence suggests that labor shares are not 
constant over time.  Over the 1960 to 2000 period, labor shares in poor countries fell, while 
shares in rich countries rose.  These changes in labor shares are driven by changes in factor 
endowments and government spending, as well as by traditional measures of globalization, such 
as trade shares, exchange rate crises, movements in foreign investment, and capital controls.  In 
particular, the results suggest that rising trade shares and exchange rate crises reduce labor’s 
share, while increasing capital intensity, capital controls and government spending increase 
labor’s share. 
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“The widening of inequalities of income distribution in the 1990's is without precedent in the post-World 
War II history of the U.S. economy.  The share of national income going to the owners of capital through 
corporate profits is surging.  The share going to compensation is falling.  This is not the way a democracy 
is supposed to work....” 
    
    Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley, as interviewed in 
    The New York Times, February 4, 1996. 
 
“Although advanced countries were exporting capital-intensive goods and importing labor-intensive goods, 
as of the early 1990s there had been virtually no change in the distribution of income between capital and 
labor; the share of compensation (wages plus benefits) in U.S. national income was the same in 1993 as it 
had been in 1973.  So at most the trade story could apply to a shift in the distribution of income between 
skilled and unskilled workers, rather than between workers and capital.” 
 
 
 
   Krugman and Obstfeld, International Economics:Theory and Policy, 2003 
   
I. Introduction 
 
In recent years, economists and other social scientists have devoted extensive research efforts to 
understanding the widening wage gap between high-skill and low-skill workers. The increasing wage gap 
between the Ahaves@ and the Ahave-nots@ has been well-documented not only in the United States but 
also in many other developed and developing countries.  Much of this research effort has focused on 
trying to identify the importance of factors such as immigration, the supply of different kinds of 
workers, skill-biased technical change, and globalization.  Globalization has been broadly defined to 
include everything from falling prices for goods which use low skill labor (such as garments) to 
increasing outsourcing by multinationals. 
  This paper focuses on a slightly different question: how has globalization affected the relative share 
of income going to capital and labor?  Numerous reports in the popular press describe a struggle 
between capital and labor, with owners of capital winning at the expense of labor.  These accounts 
typically present owners of capital as having greater bargaining power compared to labor, ostensibly 
because capital is footloose and can quickly relocate to wherever it can find the highest returns.  Rodrik, 
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(1997), in his book Has Globalization Gone Too Far, describes a similar type of bargaining game 
between capital and labor.  Despite these claims, however, there have been almost no efforts to test the 
relationship between globalization and labor’s share. 
  This paper begins by examining long run changes in the distribution of income between owners of 
capital and labor.  Several macroeconomists have reported that the share of GDP accounted by capital 
income (profits) has increased, while labor=s share of GDP (wages) has declined.  Blanchard (1996) 
documents these changes for a number of European countries, while Poterba (1997) examines trends in 
the United States.  In Europe, the change is enormous: labor=s share of aggregate income has declined 
as much as ten percentage points of GDP.  In the United States, the trend is still discernable but much 
smaller: labor=s share in national income has declined by several percentage points in GDP. Anthony 
Atkinson, reviewing the evidence presented by Poterba and others, concludes that in the majority of the 
G-7 countries there has been a shift toward nonlabor income since 1980 (Atkinson (1997)). 
  The macro-economists who have examined this trend have explored in some detail the role of labor 
supply and labor demand shifts, the role of technological change, and other factors, but have not focused 
on international competition as a potential explanation.  But a number of trade economists, such as 
Rodrik (1997), Slaughter (1996), and Richardson and  Khripounova (1996) have argued that 
globalization is affecting labor by increasing the elasticity of labor demand.  Slaughter (1996) presents 
convincing evidence that the elasticity of demand for labor is rising, and relates it to measures of 
globalization.  Although he finds that labor demand within US manufacturing is becoming more elastic, 
there is no strong relationship between changes in labor elasticity and globalization.  In another study, 
Budd and Slaughter (2000) show that union wage determination in Canada is affected by changing profits 
in both Canada and the United States.  Their work suggests that globalization does affect union wages, 
although they do not test the impact on labor shares.  Diwan (1999) shows that financial crises have 
systemically led to a decline in labor’s share relative to capital, but does not address the role of 
globalization directly. 
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This paper begins by outlining a framework which shows how globalization could account for 
changes in the share of labor income in GDP.  In this imperfectly competitive framework, firms and 
workers bargain over excess profits, and whoever has the stronger bargaining position receives a larger 
share of the profits.  Bargaining strength depends on a number of factors, including the fixed costs of 
relocating and the alternative return available elsewhere.  To the extent that the fixed costs of relocating 
are much larger for workers than for capital, this could lead capital’s share of national income to rise 
relative to labor. 
 The empirical section of the paper begins by examining the stylized facts on labor shares in 
the United States and in other countries.  The dataset, constructed using United Nations national account 
data, provides information on the share of labor compensation in national income or GDP across 100 
countries and over 40 years.  The results show that labor and capital shares have fluctuated significantly 
in the last 30 years, contrary to the assumptions of constant factor shares embedded in any models which 
use a Cobb-Douglas production technology.  Across poor and middle income countries, the share of 
GDP going to wages and benefits is declining.  However, the global trend masks major differences 
across countries.  In the United States, capital and labor shares have remained fairly constant over the 
last 35 years, while in Japan labor’s share in GDP has consistently increased.  The perception of falling 
labor shares in high income countries is driven primarily by the European experience.  In Europe, many 
countries exhibit a dramatic fall in labor shares.  Overall, the results suggest that labor’s share is rising 
in rich countries, and falling in poor countries. As pointed out by Gollin (2002), however, fluctuations 
in labor’s share are significantly reduced if labor’s share is expanded to include self-employment 
income.  In this paper, we show that this conclusion continues to hold in the time-series data as well.  
Nevertheless, even if we include self-employment income in our definition of labor’s share, this new 
dataset still shows significant variation across countries and over time.  While Gollin focused on cross-
country data for a smaller set of countries at one point in time, this paper focuses on time series 
variation across a broader sample of countries. 
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 The remaining part of the paper explores the relationship between labor shares and its 
determinants.  The results suggest that changing labor shares are driven by changes in factor 
endowments, as well as by traditional measures of globalization, such as movements in trade shares, 
exchange rate crises, movements in foreign investment, and capital controls.  In particular, rising trade 
shares and exchange rate crises reduce labor’s share, while capital controls and government spending 
increase labor’s share. Section II outlines the theoretical framework for estimation.  Section III discusses 
estimation issues, while Section IV discusses the empirical results.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework for Estimation  
 
 This framework combines the approach used by general equilibrium researchers in 
international trade to test for Stolper Samuelson effects (see, for example, Balaban and Harrigan 
(1997)), with the more partial equilibrium approach used by labor economists to test for rent-
sharing.    Tests of general equilibrium trade theory typically transform equations for determining 
the quantity of a firm’s revenue into an equation where labor’s share in revenues is a function of 
both final goods prices and changing factor inputs. Harrigan (1997) and others assume that product 
and factor markets are perfectly competitive.  We relax that assumption, introducing the possibility 
that firms make excess profits. We then allow the rents to be divided between firms and employees 
on the basis of bargaining strength, which in turn is a function of the firm’s expanding affiliate 
presence abroad.     
 
 This approach differs from previous work by Borjas and Ramey (1995), who examine the link 
between rising wage inequality and falling industry rents.  They assume that the fraction of rents 
allocated between workers and owners is constant; what changes is the extent of rents as global 
conditions become more competitive. Borjas and Ramey (1995) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993) 
also assume that bargaining power is fixed; in this proposal, bargaining power varies with the ease 
of relocation abroad. Unlike previous work, we include capital in the production function, which 
allows us to model rent-sharing as a function of both worker bargaining power and capital’s 
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bargaining power. The framework is complementary to, but differs from, Rodrik (1997) and 
Slaughter (1996), who argue that rising labor demand elasticities could shift the incidence of 
nonwage costs, costs associated with the implementation of labor standards, and government taxes 
towards labor. 
 
Output and Factor Markets 
  
 Firms and workers first choose the profit maximizing level of output, and then bargain over 
the rents.  This approach was pioneered by Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) and in the bargaining 
literature, has come to be known as the efficient bargaining model. An alternative approach 
would have been to allow employment to be chosen taking into account the negotiated wage, the 
so-called right to manage model. Like Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), we propose an efficient 
bargaining model because we want to capture the possibility that the actual wage may be different 
from the marginal revenue product of labor. In this framework, the share of rents going to 
workers depends on the relative bargaining strengths of labor and capital. A natural extension of 
this work is to explore the consequences of relaxing the assumption of efficient bargaining. 
 
 We assume there are only two factors of production, labor and capital.  The representative 
firm uses a vector v  of inputs, with Lv  units of labor and Kv  units of capital. The competitive 
return to factors is given by the vector )( 00 KL ww=0w .  The wage under perfect competition 
would be 0Lw , and the return to capital would be 0Kw .  Total returns are denoted by the vector 
)( KLww=w  with excess returns given by the difference between the two vectors.  The utility 
functions for labor and capital are denoted by: 
LLLL vwwUa )()1( 0−=  
KKKK vwwUb )()1( 0−=  
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 The revenue function is denoted by ),( vPG .  The price vector P , in turn, can be written 
as a function of the production function )(vY , so we have ))(( vYP .  Under imperfect 
competition, excess profits are equal to: 
vwvvYP 0−))),((()2( G  
Maximizing (2) with respect to v  yields the following first order condition: 
0wPv
Y μδ
δ =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡)3(  where 1)11( −+= εμ  
The elasticity of demand is given by ε .  We can implicitly define the optimal choice of v  as: 
),,(* 0wPRv μ=  
The excess rents given by (2) can be written as: 
RwR 0−= )(Rents)4( G  
Thus, total revenue, G(R), factor demands, v*, and total rents are determined by equations (1) 
through (4) and are independent of labor and capital’s bargaining power. 
 
Bargaining Over Rents 
 
 Labor and capital bargain to determine their share of the rents. The outcome of bargaining, 
if we assume Nash bargaining, can be derived from finding the solution to maximizing—over wL 
and wK—the following: 
 
        )]()[( 00 KKKLLL UvwxUvw −−  
 
 Before we can solve for w, we need to define the threat points.  We assume that if 
bargaining breaks down, capital or labor has the option to leave the firm, incur a fixed cost LF  or 
KF , and receive alternative returns *Lw  or *Kw .   These alternative returns are not necessarily 
equal to the competitive return. For example, if there is significant unemployment and labor is 
not very mobile, labor’s alternative return might be unemployment benefits which may be less 
than the competitive return. Alternatively, capital’s alternative return may exceed the competitive 
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return if capital can relocate to countries in which capital is relatively scarce.  Nor have we 
defined whether the alternative return is set locally or abroad.  However, since labor’s fixed costs 
of relocating to a foreign country are likely to be extremely high while capital’s costs are much 
lower, in the empirical section which follows we will define the alternative wage based on the 
local labor market and the alternative return to capital based on returns abroad. We will assume 
that fixed costs are proportional to the quantity of the factor employed, so that we can write 
iii vfF = . Consequently, we can write the threat points as: 
 
LLLLL vfvwUa −= *0)5(  
KKKKK vfvwUb −= *0)5(  
 
So our maximization problem becomes: 
 
)(
}{}{)6( **
RGvwvwtosubjectandwandwover
vfvwvwxvfvwvwMaximize
kkLLKL
KKKKKKLLLLLL
=+
+−+−
 
 
The first-order conditions with respect to wL and wK are (where λ is the multiplier on the 
constraint): 
 
λ=+− )()7( * KKKKKKL vfvwvwv  
λ=+− )()8( * LLLLLLK vfvwvwv  
 
Combining these first-order conditions yields the following expression for the wage: 
* *1 ( )(9) ( )
2
k
L L K K L
L L
vG Rw x w f w f
v v
⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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The expression for the return on capital is analogous to (9). With bargaining, wages depend 
positively on labor productivity, but now they also depend positively on the alternative returns to 
labor and the fixed cost to capital of relocating and negatively on the alternative return to capital 
and the fixed cost to labor of relocating.    
 
 Multiplying both sides of (9) by vL and dividing both sides of (9) by G(R) yields the 
following expression for the labor share SL: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−+==
)()()()(2
1
2
1
)(
)10(
**
RG
vf
RG
vw
RG
vf
RG
vwS
RG
vw KKKKLLLL
L
LL  
 
The expression for capital’s share is analogous to (10). Recognizing that the alternative returns 
equal the competitive return plus some premium, we can show that if both parties have equal 
bargaining strengths, factor shares depend only on 
2
1
)(2
1 00 +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −
RG
vwvw KKLL .  In this case, the 
factors each receive their competitive share iivw0  for KLi ,=  and then divide equally the excess 
profits between themselves.  If, however, fixed costs of relocating or alternative returns to the 
factors differ, then excess profits will not be split equally across factors. In particular, labor’s 
share will rise if: (1) alternative returns to labor rise (2) alternative returns to capital fall (3) fixed 
costs to capital of relocating rise or (4) fixed costs to labor of relocating fall. 
 
 Using what appears to be a very different approach, which incorporates monopolistic 
competition, unemployment and Dixit-Stiglitz utility functions in a general equilibrium 
framework, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) also derive an expression for labor’s share which is 
remarkably similar to equation (10). One major difference is that they assume that worker rents 
are a function of labor market institutions, while we derive the share of rents going to workers as 
a function of global market factors.  Under perfect competition, labor’s share will be equal to 
wL0v0/G(R), where G(R) is equal to PY and P is equal to marginal costs.  In Blanchard and 
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Giavazzi (2001), labor’s share is equal to the competitive share, multiplied by (1 + μ∃)/(1 + μ).  
Labor’s share rises with an increase in bargaining power, which is proxied by ∃.  They do not 
model the determinants of bargaining power, stating only that they are a function of labor market 
institutions. In our framework, labor’s share is also equal to the competitive share plus a fraction of 
the excess rents as determined by worker bargaining power.  However, bargaining power is 
determined by global market factors, which are explicitly incorporated into the bargaining 
framework.   
 
 
 
 
III. Estimation Issues  
  
 
 To transform (10) into an estimating equation, we begin by rewriting *iw  as equal to what 
the factor would have received under perfect competition, plus a premium above or below the 
competitive return derived from relocating: iii ww φ+= 0* . Next, we note that )(
0
RG
vw LL and 
)(
0
RG
vw KK , which are simply 
*)(
0
vPY
LLvw  and 
*)(
0
vPY
KK vw  and can be rewritten as ( )μ L
vdYd lnln
 and 
( )
μ
KvdYd lnln , using the first order conditions.  To simplify the analysis, we will begin by 
assuming only one price.  We will relax this assumption later, to allow relative prices of labor-
and capital-intensive goods to vary.  The final estimating equation will depend on which 
functional form we choose to approximate the production function, Y .  We assume that Y  can be 
approximated by a translog function: 
mtitimmiitiiit vvbvbavYY lnln2
1ln)(lnln)11( 000 ∑∑+∑+==  
 Differentiating (11) with respect to each lnvi yields the following: 
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)ln(
*)(
)12( 20
0
lt
Lt
LmmL
LL
v
vbb
vPY
vwa =∑+=  
)ln(
*)(
)12( 20
0
lt
Kt
KmmK
KK
v
v
bb
vPY
vw
b =∑+=  
 
 Combining (11), (12a) and (12b) yields the following estimating equation for labor’s share 
in firm i’s revenues: 
2)()(2
1)ln()13( 10 LKKKLL
i
i
Li
ff
RG
v
RG
v
K
LS −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++= φφγγ  
 
 To get an estimating equation for wages, we divide both sides of equation (9) by the price 
level to obtain the following estimating equation for the real wage paid by firm i:  
iL
iL
k
K
iL
k
KiL
iL
iL fv
vw
v
vfw
v
Yw 5
*
43
*
210)14( ββββββ −−+++=  
 
 This framework suggests that real wages and labor’s share are positively related to labor’s 
alternative return and capital’s fixed costs of relocating, and negatively related to capital’s 
alternative return elsewhere and labor’s cost of relocating.  The correlation between the labor-
capital ratio 
K
L
 and labor’s share is ambiguous, since the derivative of labor share with respect to 
)ln(
K
L
 varies with the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. In the Cobb-Douglas 
case, for example, the derivative of labor share with respect to )ln(
K
L
 is zero and factor shares 
should be unaffected by changes in endowments.  However, the coefficient on ln(
K
L
) could also 
be positive or negative, depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is high or low.  Real 
wages are a positive function of labor productivity, captured by our G(R)/v.  As long as the fixed 
costs for capital of relocating exceed capital’s alternative return, real wages are positively related 
to capital intensity.  However, if the fixed cost for capital is lower than its' alternative return, 
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making it likely that capital will relocate, then real wages are a negative function of capital 
intensity.  
 
 In addition, the basic specification in (13) assumes only one output and no factor-biased 
technical change. If there were several outputs, then relative prices of labor versus-capital 
intensive goods would affect relative shares. Similarly, factor-biased technical change could also 
affect labor shares. A modified estimating equation which includes n relative prices P and factor-
biased technical changeθ  is given by: 
 
∑
=
+++++−−+=
n
i Lt
nt
i
Kt
Lt
t
tKKKKLLLL
Li P
P
K
L
RG
vf
RG
vw
RG
vf
RG
vwS
7
654
*
32
*
10 ln)ln()ln()()()()(
)15( γθ
θγγγγγγγ  
 The estimating equation (15) embeds a number of potential explanations for labor’s 
changing share in firm-level value-added. Changes in labor’s share could occur primarily due to 
factors unrelated to globalization, such as changes in endowments of L  and K , or factor-biased 
technological change. Another possibility is that globalization affects factor shares through 
changes in final goods prices.  This is the standard effect deriving from a Heckscher-Ohlin  (HO) 
framework.  In the HO framework, globalization affects final goods prices, which in turn affect 
returns to factors used intensively to produce those goods. This effect has been examined in some 
detail by Harrigan and others (see, for example, Harrigan and Balaban(1997)) and is captured in 
our framework by the iγ s.  To the extent that globalization affects factor shares by altering the 
bargaining power of labor relative to capital, then other factors should matter as well.  These 
include alternative returns to capital and labor, as well as the fixed costs of relocating abroad.1 
 
 
, which allows us to rewrite (11) as:        
                                                          
1 One issue that we have not discussed is openness per se, as measured either by policies such as tariffs or the outcomes of such policies, typically 
captured by trade shares.  In our framework, barriers to trade affect factor shares through their impact on the prices of labor-intensive relative to 
capital-intensive goods.  To the extent that our measure of relative prices fails to capture the importance of trade restrictions, an ideal variable 
would be a measure of relative tariffs on labor versus capital.   We are working on creating such measures. 
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(12) SLt =  γ0 + γ1ln(Lt/Kt) + γ2ln(θLt/θKt) + 1/2(φLvL/G(R) - φKvK /G(R)) + (fK - fL)/2 
             
 Clearly, we cannot distinguish between factor-augmenting and product-specific technical change, 
since these variables could affect the latter as well as the former.  If, however, technological change is 
factor augmenting, then one testable implication is that γ1 should equal γ2. It is easy to show that the 
coefficient γ1 (and consequently, γ2)  does not need  to be positive.  The derivative of  labor share with 
respect  to ln(L/K)  is equal to: 
             
∂SL/∂ln(L/K) = γ1 =  (1 + 1/σ)/[(SL/SK)(1 + SK/SL)2] 
 
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the elasticity of substitution σ is equal to –1, so the derivative of labor share 
with respect to ln(L/K) is zero and factor shares should be unaffected by changes in endowments.   
However, the coefficient on L/K could also be positive or negative, depending on whether the elasticity of 
substitution is high or low.  
 
Data To estimate (11) or (12) requires data on labor shares, endowments, returns to factors in excess of 
the home competitive return if the factor relocates abroad, and measures of the fixed costs of relocating for 
labor and capital.  The United Nations gathers detailed national accounts data across countries from 1950 
onwards. Labor share is defined as total compensation to employees divided by either national income or 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The number of years available by country varies; some countries begin 
in 1950 while others begin in 1990.  Compensation includes both wages to employees and other benefits 
(such as realization of stock options).  Since national income also includes payments to unincorporated 
enterprises, which are typically included as part of operating surplus and classified as payments to capital, 
this definition of labor share is likely to represent a low estimate of labor’s share. Krueger (1999) 
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discusses in detail some of the pitfalls involved in using national accounts data to measure labor income.  
He argues that the reported labor income share is probably a ceiling.  Gollin (2002) argues that at least 
part of payments to unincorporated enterprises, also known as self-employment income, should be 
included in labor’s share.  He argues that including self-employment restores the constancy of labor 
shares, using a smaller cross-section of the same data source as we do here.  Consequently, I also estimate 
(12) including alternative measures of self-employment in my definition of labor share.    However, fewer 
countries actually report self-employment income, and those countries that do report are primarily the 
upper income countries.  Consequently, we are faced with a dilemma: As Gollin points out, at least part of 
self-employment income should be included in labor’s share, however, if we only include those countries, 
then we exclude many countries. 
  Labor inputs can be captured by the nation’s labor force, which is collected and reported by the 
World Bank.  For capital stock I  use the series constructed by Nehru et al (1993), updated to include 1997 
data. I assume that the fixed cost of relocating for labor is large (possibly infinite in the short run) and 
captured by the country and year specific effects. The fixed costs of relocating for capital can be captured 
by several measures.   The nominal exchange rate captures the cost of purchasing new plant and equipment 
if relocation occurs.  We would expect that a depreciated exchange rate would increase the costs of 
relocating for capital, raising labor’s share.  I measure the nominal exchange rate as the market rate, 
period average, as reported by the International Monetary Fund.  Other fixed costs of relocating include 
capital account restrictions such as withholding taxes, which make it difficult for capital to relocate.  These 
can be captured using variables from the International Monetary Fund’s annual publication, Trade and 
Exchange Restrictions.  We simply add up the different measures of capital controls (equal to 1 if ther are 
controls; zero otherwise) to arrive at a composite measure.  A country with no capital controls would have 
a value of zero; a country with all types of controls would have a maximum value of 5. 
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 The independent variables φL and φK measure the return to labor and capital in the foreign country, 
relative to the home competitive return.  Unfortunately, these are not directly observed.  As a proxy for 
the return to labor if it relocates in a foreign country, I use the ratio of foreign GDP per worker to GDP 
per worker at home, lagged one period, as well as net remittances into and out of the country.  We would 
expect that if alternative returns to labor are higher abroad, then inward remittances rise.  In our model 
this would be associated with an increase in  labor’s share..  As a proxy for the relative return to capital at 
home versus abroad,  I use gross inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment.  In future versions of 
this paper, alternative returns to both factors will also be calculated using the data on capital and labor 
payments, divided by measures of L and K.  For each country, an alternative return to each factor can be 
calculated using the rest of the world data on factor payments and factor quantities. 
 The basic specification assumes only one output and no factor-biased technical change.  If there were 
several outputs, then relative prices of labor versus-capital intensive goods would affect relative shares.  
Similarly, factor-biased technical change could also affect labor shares.  A modified estimating equation 
which includes relative prices as well as factor-biased technical change is given by: 
 
(13) SLt =γ0 + γ1ln(Lt/Kt) + γ2ln(θLt/θKt) +γ3ln(PLt/PKt) + 1/2(φLvL/G(R) - φKvK /G(R)) + (fK - fL)/2 
 
  
 At the aggregate level, prices of labor-intensive and capital-intensive goods are not available.  
However, relative prices can be proxied in several different ways.  Bourguigion and Morrisson (1990) 
argue that relative prices are a function of relative world supplies of factors.  This suggests using world 
endowments of labor relative to capital as a proxy for relative prices.  Another possibility, which is used 
in this paper, is to use the export and import price indices calculated by the World Bank.  I define the 
price of labor-intensive goods as the average export price of the most labor-intensive countries, defined as 
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those countries with labor to capital ratios in the top 5 percent of the distribution each year.  Similarly, the 
price of capital-intensive goods is defined as the average export price of the most capital-intensive 
countries, defined as those countries with labor to capital ratios in the bottom 5 percent of the annual 
distribution.  To allow these prices to have differential effects across countries, the relative price is 
multiplied by the country’s labor to capital ratio.  
 The estimating equations (12) and (13) embed a number of potential explanations for labor’s 
changing share in GDP.  Changes in labor’s share could occur primarily due to factors unrelated to 
globalization, such as changes in endowments of L and K, or factor-biased technological change. These 
effects are captured by coefficients (1 and (2.  Another possibility is that globalization affects factor shares 
through changes in final goods prices.  This is the standard effect deriving from a Heckscher-Ohlin  (HO) 
framework.  In the HO framework, globalization affects final goods prices, which in turn affect returns to 
factors used intensively to produce those goods.  This effect has been examined in some detail by Harrigan 
and others (see, for example, Harrigan and Balaban(1997)) and which is captured in our framework by (3.  
To the extent that globalization affects factor shares by altering the bargaining power of labor relative to 
capital, then other factors should matter as well.  These include alternative returns to capital and labor 
abroad, as well as the fixed costs of relocating. 
 One factor that we have not discussed is openness per se, as measured either by policies such as 
tariffs or the outcomes of such policies, typically captured by trade shares.  In our framework, barriers to 
trade affect factor shares through their impact on the prices of labor-intensive relative to capital-intensive 
goods.  To the extent that our measure of relative prices fails to capture the importance of trade 
restrictions, an ideal variable would be a measure of relative tariffs on labor versus capital.  
Unfortunately, relative tariffs are not available across countries and over time.  Typically, the only 
available data are trade shares or average tariffs across all goods.  However, to the extent that protection is 
typically imposed to protect labor interests, regardless of a country’s comparative advantage, then 
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aggregate measures could provide a useful indication of trends in the prices of labor-intensive goods.  
Evidence in countries such as the United States suggest that protection is typically focused on labor-
intensive sectors.  Even in developing countries, such as Mexico or Morocco, Currie and Harrison (1997) 
and Hanson and Harrison (1999) show that the pattern of protection is also skewed towards protecting 
labor-intensive goods.  Consequently, the empirical analysis will include openness to trade as an 
independent variable, as an imperfect means of capturing the impact of trade policy on the relative prices 
of labor and capital intensive goods.  To the extent that increases in trade reflect a fall in the protection of 
labor-intensive goods, we would expect increasing openness to be associated with a fall in labor shares.  
 
 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
   
A. Stylized Facts   The United Nations gathers detailed national accounts data across countries from 1950 
onwards.  As discussed above, labor shares are computed both as the share of wages and benefits in 
national income and as a fraction of GDP, following Gollin (2002).  Table 1 summarizes changes in labor 
shares across income categories during the entire period, where labor share is defined as wages plus 
compensation divided by national income.   We begin the analysis by focusing on changes in labor’s share 
after 1993, since this has been a topic of recent concern.  Countries are defined as rich if they are above 
the median GDP per capita in 1985.  Raw means, reported in the first two rows and first two columns, 
indicate a slight increase in labor’s share in national income from the 1960s through 1993 to the 1993-96 
period.  The means also show that labor’s share in national income is almost the same in poor and rich 
countries. 
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 These means, however, hide important within country changes in labor shares.  Since the 
composition of the means may change as countries are added or leave the sample, the last three rows in 
Table 1 are more informative for indicating within country changes in labor’s share. These means show 
that in poor countries, labor’s share fell on average by .1 percentage points per year prior to 1993.  The 
decline in labor’s share was more rapid after 1993: labor’s share fell on average by .3 percentage points 
per year.  In the rich countries, labor’s share grew by .2 percentage points prior to 1993 and fell by .4 
percentage points per year after 1993.  These means indicate a reversal in the trend for rich countries post-
1993, while they indicate a persistent decline in labor’s share for poor countries during the entire period. 
 If we take means for all countries within each subperiod, then look at within country differences, 
we get a slightly different story.  The last row in Table 1 shows again that poor countries on average 
exhibited a decline in labor share post-1993, if we take within country means before and after 1993 and 
then take the difference between the two.  Using this approach, labor shares in rich countries increased 
slightly.  Overall, the trends suggest a fall in labor shares in the poorer countries, and a slight increase in 
rich countries post 1993. 
 The next 5 columns of Table 1 report changes in labor shares by quintiles.  The results are similar 
to those in the first two columns.  In general, labor shares rise with income, although the progression is 
not perfect.  Focusing on the last row of  Table 1, the mean changes in labor income follow a clear 
pattern:  labor share fell in the poorest countries, changed very little in the upper middle 20 percent of 
countries, and increased in the richest countries.  The progression is quite clear: enormous declines in 
labor’s share in the poorest 20 percent of countries, and significant increases in labor’s share in the top 20 
percent of all countries. 
 Chart 1 summarizes the overall trends in labor shares across 53 countries with data for both 1970 
and 1990.    The results show that for some countries, there have been dramatic changes over the period.  
The results in Chart 1 are consistent with the results reported in Table 1: those countries which 
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experienced the most significant reductions in labor share are the poorest ones.  In Chart 1, we used the 
World Bank’s 1990 category of countries as low income, middle income, or upper income, a definition 
which is  based on GDP per capita.  Labor shares in national income fell between 6 and 8 percentage 
points for the low income countries in our sample.  Again, there is a systematic relationship between 
movements in labor shares and income status.  Although middle income countries also experienced a fall 
in labor’s share in income, the reduction was not large, especially for upper middle income countries.  For 
the high income countries, labor’s share in national income actually rose.  The average increase was 
almost four percentage points of GDP.  The results are unchanged if we compute average changes in labor 
shares weighted by population: while labor shares in poor countries fell, the share of labor’s income in 
GDP in the high income countries rose by almost 4 percentage points.  If we redo the analysis with 1960 
as the starting point, the trend is the same: labor shares for the high income countries rose on average 
during the thirty year period, while labor shares for the poorer countries fell. 
 One question which naturally arises is how accurate are these data?  Since this is the only 
comprehensive source of national accounts data, a systematic comparison with other data sources is not 
possible.   However, UNIDO does collect manufacturing wages for a select number of countries.  For six 
countries in Figure 0, we calculated changes in labor shares relative to an index using the UNIDO data.   
For both data sources, we set 1977 equal to 100.  Average manufacturing wages, weighted by employment 
in each subsector, were multiplied by the labor force and then divided by value-added.  The movements in 
labor shares are denoted by lshgol1.  Labor shares calculated using the UN data were then plotted on the 
same graphs, with UN data indicated by lshgol.  What is remarkable about these two different data sources 
is that movements in labor shares are highly correlated, although the manufacturing wage data shows 
larger year to year fluctuations than the UN data.  This is reasonable, since the manufacturing sectors of 
most countries only account for a small share in the labor force, and consequently we would expect less 
fluctuations in the UN data, which includes all sectors of the economy. 
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 Figures 1 through 6 provide time series evidence on labor shares for individual countries in our 
sample.  The first 4 figures show trends in labor shares, measured using labor compensation as a share in 
GDP.  Graphs using labor compensation as a share of national income are not included here, since the 
time series behavior of both is highly similar.  The econometric results that follow also are very similar if 
we use labor compensation divided by national income or divided by GDP.    A number of interesting 
facts emerge.  First, among the high income countries (see Figure 4) the United States is almost the only 
country where labor’s share in GDP has remained relatively stable.  Since the late 1960s, labor’s share in 
GDP in the United States has fluctuated by only a couple of percentage points of GDP.  This contrasts 
sharply with many other countries, which have experienced both large increases as well as declines in 
labor shares.  Among the high-income countries, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland steadily increased their 
labor shares over more than thirty years.    However, a number of European countries have experienced 
declines in labor shares since the early 1970s.  Those countries include Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Those declines explain the 
preoccupation by macro-economists such as Olivier Blanchard with falling labor shares in Europe. The 
results are consistent if we use national income as the denominator or GDP. 
 Figure 5 shows trends in labor shares if we include self-employment in the numerator with labor 
compensation.  Including self-employment as part of labor’s share significantly reduces the cross-country 
variation in labor’s share, as pointed out very clearly in Gollin (2002).  The reduction in dispersion is also 
evident from Figure 7.  While Gollin (2002) made this point with a pure cross-section, his point is also 
correct if we extend his sample to include time series data, as we do in both Figure 5 and Figure 7.  
However, it is important to note that the sample size is significantly reduced—to less than one third of the 
original sample. The sample is heavily weighted towards developed countries and a number of the eastern 
european countries.  The second point is that even these measures of labor share do continue to vary over 
time, although clearly the variance is lower.  Countries with large fluctuations in labor’s share over time 
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include Botswana, Congo, Finland, Hungary, Jamaica, the Netherlands, Korea, and Sweden.  In these 
countries, labor’s share (even including self-employment) has fluctuated by more than 10 percentage points 
of GDP.  Figure 5 also shows that there is a strong relationship between movements in the two measures 
of labor share over time for many countries. Simple correlations across the 35 countries with both 
measures shows that for 27 of the 35 countries, the correlation between labor share including and 
excluding self-employment is positive and significant and generally exceeds .7   Since self-employment has 
been declining in recent years (in part due to a reduction in agricultural income), this measure of labor’s 
share shows a steady decline in many countries.  Nevertheless, the range of change is smaller than if we 
measure labor’s share using the more conventional measures.  Again, the only stable country is the United 
States, where this modified measure of labor’s share shows a variation of less than 3 percent of GDP over 
the last 37 years!   
 This paper focuses primarily on the impact of increasing globalization on labor shares.  However, 
it is worth examining trends in one other measure that could be used to as indicators of the relative 
strength of capital versus labor: corporate tax rates.  Rodrik (1997, p. 64) has argued that globalization has 
made it more difficult to tax capital and has increased labor’s share of the tax burden.  In theory, this is  
because it is easier for capital to relocate to low tax regions, while labor finds it more difficult to move. 
 Figure 6 reports corporate taxes paid by corporations for 25 countries with available data. There is 
no clear trend in corporate tax rates according to Figure 6.  While it is certainly true that corporate tax 
rates in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have fallen since the mid-1980s, corporate tax 
rates in Italy, Japan, the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Korea have increased.  Nor, without further 
analysis, can we link these trends to globalization per se.  In the remainder of this paper, we focus 
exclusively on explaining trends in labor shares. 
 Before turning to the estimation results, we report trends in labor shares using simple regressions 
with labor share regressed on time.  The results are reported in Table 2 and Appendix Table 1.  While 
Appendix Table 1 reports the coefficients on time by country, Table 2 reports the results across all 
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countries, as well as across income quintiles based on 1985 GDP per capita.  Defining labor shares as 
either labor compensation divided by national income or GDP, the trends are consistent with those 
reported in Table 1 and Chart 1.  Labor share is rising across all countries, by .1 percentage point per year 
if labor share is defined as compensation/national income, and by .02 percentage points per year if labor 
share is defined as compensation/GDP.  Across income categories, labor share is falling for the poor 
countries and rising for the rich countries.  Using both definitions of national income, labor share is falling 
by .2 percentage points per year for countries in the bottom quintile, falling by .1 percentage points per 
year for the lower middle 20 percent, and falling slightly or rising for the middle and upper middle 
quintiles.  Labor shares are rising for the top quintile, by .2 percentage points per year using either 
definition of labor share. 
 We also report results for self-employment.  Across the 38 countries with available data, self-
employment earnings as a share of GDP are falling, by an average of .3 percentage points per year.  
Consequently, if we define labor’s share to include self-employment, we find that labor’s share is falling 
across all countries with available data, by .2 percentage points per year.  Clearly, our perceptions on the 
trends in labor’s share are affected by the definition we use.  However, it is also clear from the time trends 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 and the figures that labor share—however defined—is not constant over time.   
    
B.  Estimation Results 
  
 Results from estimating (13) using cross-country, annual time series data are reported in Table 3.  
In the remaining analysis, we chose to report results defining labor share as a percent of GDP, rather than 
national income.  The results are similar if national income is used as the denominator, but the sample size 
is larger if we use GDP.  A number of consistent results emerge across specifications, although with the 
addition of more independent variables the number of degrees of freedom falls significantly and standard 
errors become quite large.  Across all specifications, the coefficient on relative endowments L/K is 
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negative and significant.  This suggests that one important factor driving labor shares is changes in 
endowments: increases in the labor force (or declines in the capital stock) lead to a fall in labor shares.  
This implies that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is relatively low.  For example, a 
fall in the capital stock cannot be easily substituted with more labor, leading to a more than proportionate 
increase in return to capital relative to labor and resulting in a fall in labor’s share.  This is Poterba’s 
explanation for the observed decline is US labor shares in the early 1990s.  As indicated in columns (7) 
and (8), the results also suggest that capital and labor are less substitutable in rich countries than in poor 
countries: the coefficient on L/K is larger (and more negative) by a factor of 2 for rich countries relative to 
poor countries. 
 The coefficient on relative GDP per capita is generally negative, as predicted by the model.  
Higher income per person at home, relative to income abroad, weakens labor’s bargaining position and 
leads to lower labor shares.  Not surprisingly, however, this result is only true in “rich” countries.  In 
columns (7) and (8), we distinguish between poor countries and rich countries by splitting the sample in 
two, based on the median GDP per capita in 1985.  As the results indicate, the negative coefficient on 
GDP per capita in columns (2) through (6) are driven by the observations for rich countries.   
 Across a number of specifications, we find that capital controls are positive and statistically 
significant.  These results are predicted by the model:  higher fixed costs of relocating, as proxied by 
capital controls, weaken capital’s bargaining position and lead to higher labor shares.  The magnitude of 
the effect is large:  For example, eliminating capital controls would raise labor’s share in GDP between 1 
and 2 percentage points.  However, the significance on the capital control measure is not present in all 
specifications.  In particular, capital controls are only significant if we introduce government spending as a 
share of GDP as an additional variable.  We introduce government spending as an additional variable to 
investigate whether capital controls are a proxy for general  government intervention in the economy.  In 
fact the results suggest the opposite: the stronger effects of capital controls in the last four columns of 
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Table 3 suggest that there is a negative relationship between capital controls and government spending in 
the data. 
 In column (3) we introduce the log of the nominal exchange rate.  We had hypothesized that a 
more appreciated exchange rate would lower the fixed costs for capital of relocating abroad, resulting in a 
positive relationship between exchange rate depreciation and labor shares.  Although our hypothesis is 
correct for rich countries, the coefficient is the opposite sign (negative) and significant for poor countries.  
One alternative interpretation is that the exchange rate captures the relative price of tradeables relative to 
non-tradeables.  An exchange rate depreciation would indicate a fall in the price of non-tradeables, which 
could be linked with falling labor shares if non-tradeables are more labor-intensive.  This is likely to be the 
case. In poor countries.  Nevertheless, these results (and the results that follow) show a strong, significant 
correlation between exchange rate movements and labor shares for poor countries: an exchange rate 
depreciation is accompanied by a sharp fall in labor’s share.  This point is illustrated by Appendix Figure 
1, which highlights the movements in labor’s share in Mexico.  Movements in labor share in Mexico have 
been driven almostly entirely by movements in the exchange rate, which depreciated sharply in the early 
1980s, appreciated in late 1980s and early 1990s, then depreciated sharply at the end of 1994. 
 In column (3) we also add the trade share in GDP, defined as exports plus imports divided by 
GDP.  As we indicated earlier, the interpretation of the coefficient on this regressor is somewhat 
problematic.  Nevertheless, the negative coefficient on trade shares is negative and significant, suggesting 
that an increase in trade shares is associated with a fall in labor shares.  In column (4) we add our measure 
of relative price.  As expected, the relative price of labor relative to capital intensive goods are positively 
correlated with labor’s share, although the effect is not statistically significant.   
 In a recent paper, Diwan (1999) examines the relationship between labor shares and financial 
crises.  Diwan defines financial crisis broadly, as a year where the nominal exchange rate depreciates by 
more than 25 percent between the beginning and the end of the calendar year.  He finds a significant 
negative impact of financial crisis on labor shares.  This leads him to conclude that labor is bearing 
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disproportionately the burden (relative to capital) from financial crises associated with large swings in the 
exchange rate.  To test whether our other measures, such as capital restrictions or trade shares, are 
proxying for such crises, we add Diwan’s definition of financial crisis in column (4) of Table 3.  Even 
after controlling for annual exchange rate changes, the crisis variable has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, supporting Diwan’s finding that large swings in the exchange rate lead to a fall in 
labor’s share.  However, the addition of this variable leaves the other coefficients relatively unchanged.  
The results also suggest that an exchange rate crisis leads to a larger fall in labor’s share in poor relative to 
rich countries, as indicated by the doubling of the coefficient on the crisis variable for poor relative to rich 
countries. 
 In columns (5) and (6) we add DFI inflows and outflows, inward and outward remittances, and 
government spending as additional regressors.  We anticipated that DFI inflows would be a good measure 
of alternative returns to capital elsewhere.  Consequently, we expected that an increase in inflows suggests 
low alternative returns to capital elsewhere, raising labor’s share.  Instead, the coefficient on DFI inflows 
is negative, while the coefficient on DFI outflows is positive, which is puzzling.  One possibility is that 
inflows capture the ease with which investment is able to enter and leave the country.  In this case, DFI 
flows are negative correlated with fixed costs of relocating capital, and the negative coefficient is 
consistent with the model.  Although the coefficient on inward remittances is generally insignificant, there 
is a negative and significant relationship between labor’s share and outward remittances.  Countries where 
alternative returns to labor at home are higher than abroad, as proxied by the volume of outward 
remittances, have lower labor shares.  This reflects either the lower bargaining power of labor at home or 
the impact of competition by immigrants on domestic wages, or both. 
  It is possible that the positive and significant impact of capital controls is proxying for 
general government intervention in an economy, which may increase labor shares through other means.  
For example, countries with capital controls may also intervene in labor markets, impose higher minimum 
wages, and take other measures to increase labor’s share.  To control for this possibility, we add 
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government spending relative to GDP as an additional independent variable.  This is a better direct 
measure of government intervention in the economy. The results suggest that government spending does 
have a significant redistributive impact.  The coefficient on government spending is positive and 
significant, indicating that an increase in government spending is associated with an increase in labor’s 
share.  We add GDP growth and inflation in column (6), to test whether our results simply indicate that 
labor shares vary with the business cycle.  Although the results indicate that labor shares are counter-
cyclical (labor shares fall when GDP growth is higher), the addition of these variables do not affect the 
earlier results.   
 One potential problem with the estimates reported in Table 3 is that both labor shares and some of 
the independent variables are jointly determined.  In Table 4 we redo the estimation using instrumental 
variables (IV).  We instrument log(L/K), capital controls, DFI, government spending and trade shares 
with lags of all the right-hand side variables and the country’s terms of trade.  The results reported in 
Table 4 are robust to the use of IV techniques.  Almost all of the point estimates in Table 4 remain very 
similar in magnitude, with no changes in statistical significance.  The IV results continue to point to the 
following factors to explain a decline in labor’s share: a rising labor to capital ratio, a fall in capital 
controls, increasing relative GDP per capita, and an exchange rate crisis.  However, the negative impact 
of a large exchange rate depreciation on labor’s share is restricted to poor countries.  Trade shares are also 
negatively correlated with labor shares, but the results in the IV estimation suggest that in both magnitude 
and significance trade shares have a more important  (negative) impact on labor shares in poor countries.    
Taken together, the results suggest that rising trade shares are associated with a decline in labor’s share in 
poor countries, while inward DFI is associated with a decline in labor’s share in rich countries.  
Government spending positively affects labor’s share in all countries, as do capital controls.   
 Table 5 reports several extensions, focusing primarily on the definition of labor’s share.  In 
columns (1) through (4) of Table 5 we redefine labor’s share to include self-employment. Unfortunately, 
many countries do not report self-employment income. The results are qualitatively the same, although 
 27
there are some differences.  The coefficient on log (L/K) remains negative, while the coefficient on capital 
controls remains positive, and more than doubles in magnitude.  The coefficient on relative GDP per 
capita is even larger in magnitude and remains negative.  One difference is that the coefficient on both the 
nominal exchange rate and the crisis variable (reflecting large swings in the nominal exchange rate) is now 
close to zero, generally positive, and insignificant.  This reflects the differences between rich and poor 
countries highlighted in Tables 3 and 4.  As indicated earlier, this sample includes primarily rich 
countries, for whom exchange rate movements generally do not translate into a fall in labor shares.   
 The coefficient on trade shares is now larger in magnitude, negative, and statistically significant.  
The coefficient on inward DFI is positive and significant, suggesting that inward DFI is associated with an 
increase in labor’s share.  This is the major difference between this new labor share measure and the 
results reported in Tables 3 and 4.  However, due to the small sample size, it is difficult to make 
generalizations about these results. In column (5) we explore the possibility that measures of globalization 
could affect labor shares by affecting the coefficient on L/K.  The coefficient on the interaction of trade 
shares and L/K is generally insignificant, suggesting no effect of globalization through this particular 
channel.  We also experimented with an interaction of effective tariffs and L/K, and obtained the same 
results. 
 Table 6 reports the results when the basic specification is redone using both five year averages and 
long differences.  For the five year averages, all variables are averaged over five year intervals, and the 
OLS estimation is reported in the last four columns of Table 6.  For the long differences, all variables are 
averaged in the first 10 years and the last 10 years of the sample, and then first-differenced.  The results 
are reported in the first 3 columns of Table 6.  What is remarkable about Table 6 is how little these 
transformations of the data change the basic results, particularly for the five year averages.  The 
coefficient on the labor to capital ratio remains the same in magnitude and significance, with the same 
differences between rich and poor countries.  Although the statistical significance of the coefficient on 
capital controls is affected by these transformations, the magnitude of the coefficient remains the same.  
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We continue to find that trade shares are associated with a decline in labor shares.  The effect is large and 
statistically significant.  Again, increasing government spending is associated with an increase in labor’s 
share, exchange rate crises are associated with a fall in labor’s share for poor countries, and inward DFI is 
associated with a decline in labor’s share.  Unfortunately, averaging the sample and taking long 
differences leads to much smaller sample sizes, and also affects the statistical significance of some 
coefficients. 
  Table 7 reports the actual changes in the independent variables between the earlier and later 
period, where “later” is defined as 1993 through 1996.  Combined with the coefficient estimates reported 
in Table 4, this allows us to decompose the source of actual changes in labor’s share.  The results, 
reported in the last two columns, suggest that labor shares have increased in rich countries primarily 
because the capital stock has grown relative to the labor force.  Another significant factor increasing 
labor’s share in rich countries is the increase in government spending in GDP, which can account for a one 
percentage point increase in labor’s share in national income post-1993 in the rich countries and a .4 
percentage point decline in labor’s share in the poor countries.   
 In the poor countries, although the increase in capital stock relative to the labor force has 
contributed to an increase in labor’s share in national income, that increase has essentially been wiped out 
by the negative impact of reducing capital controls and depreciating exchange rates.  So in the poorer 
countries, it does appear that globalization has had a detrimental impact on labor’s share in national 
income.  The poor countries have also been negatively affected by the larger increase in trade shares, and 
the fall in government spending.   
 Overall, the results suggest that quantitatively most important factor driving changes in labor 
shares are changes in relative endowments of capital relative to labor.  However other factors related to 
liberalization of their economies have reduced labor’s share in poor countries.  These include reductions in 
capital controls and increases in trade shares, as well as a reduction in government spending and 
devaluations in poor countries. Large nominal exchange rate depreciations reduce the share of national 
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income going to labor, while capital controls increase it.  The magnitude of these effects is not small.  For 
example, eliminating capital controls would raise labor’s share in GDP in poor countries by up to 5 
percentage points. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 During the 1990s, public attention increasingly focused on the potentially negative consequences of 
globalization.   In particular, economists and other social scientists devoted extensive research efforts to 
understanding the links between trade liberalization and rising wage inequality.  However, the focus on wage 
inequality eclipsed many other important research problems.  This paper seeks to address these omissions by 
analyzing the impact of trade and capital flows on labor’s share in GDP. 
. To test for the impact of different measures of globalization on labor shares, I combine detailed 
national accounts data from the United Nations with measures of trade openness, capital account restrictions, 
and capital flows.  These data provide information on the share of labor compensation in national income or 
GDP across over 100 countries and over 40 years.   Two interesting stylized facts emerge from the results.  
Contrary to received wisdom, the evidence suggests that labor shares are not constant over time.   Between 
1960 and the end of the 1990s, labor shares in poor countries fell, while shares in rich countries rose.  Simply 
documenting these changes in labor’s share is important; this is the first effort to show the significant 
fluctuations in labor’s share over time.  However, this paper seeks to go further, by testing whether different 
measures of globalization can explain these observed changes in labor shares. 
 Overall, the results suggest that changes in factor shares are primarily linked to changes in 
capital/labor ratios.  However, measures of globalization (such as capital controls or direct investment 
flows) also play a role.  Exchange rate crises in poor countries lead to declining labor shares, suggesting 
that labor pays disproportionately the price when there are large swings in exchange rates.  Capital 
controls are associated with an increase in labor’s share, suggesting that imposing such controls are 
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beneficial to labor.  In addition, increasing trade shares are associated with a fall in labor’s share.  This 
result is robust across specifications.  Other factors, such as government spending, also matter.  Increasing 
government spending is associated with an increase in labor shares, for both rich and poor countries.  
Finally, foreign investment inflows are associated with an increase in labor’s share, if labor’s share is 
measured including self-employment.   
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         Table 1 
 
 
 
Changes in Labor Shares: Different Means by Income Category 
 
 
 
 Poor 
 
Rich Bottom 20 %  Bottom Middle 
20 % 
Middle 20 % Upper 
Middle 
20 % 
Top 20 % 
Mean Labor Share, Prior to 1990 
 
.447 .505 
 
.323 .515 .430 .492 .528 
Mean Labor Share, 1990-2000 
 
.442 .488 .426 .453 .404 .467 .520 
Mean Within Country Change in Labor 
Share, Prior to 1990 
 
-.0001 .0005 -.004 -.001 -.0001 -.0008 .001 
Mean Within Country Change in Labor 
Share, 1990-2000 
 
-.003 -.001 .001 -.010 -.003 -.002 .0002 
        
 
   
 
Table 2 
 
Testing for a Time Trend in Labor Shares 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient on t 
(T-value in ()) 
R-Square N Number of 
Countries 
Fixed Effect Estimation 
(All Countries) 
    
   Labor Compensation/National Income .001 
(8.6) 
.001 3076 131 
   Labor Compensation/GDP -.0001 
(-0.8) 
.001 3626 152 
   Self-Employed Earnings (OSPUE)/GDP -.003 
(-12.2) 
.01 720 44 
   Labor Compensation + OSPUE/GDP -.002 
(-10.6) 
.01 720 44 
     
Labor Compensation/National Income     
   Bottom 20 % -.002 
(-4.6) 
.08 272 18 
   Lower Middle 20 % -.001 
(-2.2) 
.01 380 18 
   Middle 20 % 
 
0.000 
(1.0) 
.003 320 13 
   Upper Middle 20 % .001 
(2.6) 
.02 388 15 
   Upper 20 % .002 
(14.6) 
.29 542 15 
     
Labor Compensation/GDP     
   Bottom 20 % -.002 
(-3.4) 
.04 302 18 
   Lower Middle 20 % -.001 
(-5.5) 
.07 447 20 
   Middle 20 % -.001 
(-4.2) 
.01 452 17 
   Upper Middle 20 % 0.000 
(1.5) 
.01 452 17 
   Upper 20 % .002 
(10.3) 
.17 542 15 
 
 
 
 Notes: All specifications include country dummies.  Percentiles based on  median real GDP per capita over the period. 
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Table 3  
 
OLS Estimation 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Below 
Median Per 
Capita 
GDP in 
1985 
(8) 
Above 
Median Per 
Capita GDP 
in 1985 
 
Log (L/K) 
 
 
-.077 
(-17.5) 
-.097 
(-10.6) 
-.085 
(-9.2) 
-.105 
(-8.0) 
-.098 
(-7.6) 
-.088 
(-6.4) 
-.066 
(-3.9) 
-.122 
(-7.5) 
Capital Controls 
 
 
-- .001 
(0.9) 
.001 
(0.6) 
.002 
(1.6) 
.003 
(2.4) 
.002 
(2.1) 
.003 
(1.4) 
.003 
(2.0) 
Relative GDP 
Per Capita 
 
-- -.227 
(-2.2) 
-.119 
(-1.1) 
-.178 
(-1.8) 
-.050 
(-0.5) 
-0.129 
(-1.4) 
.119 
(1.4) 
-.375 
(-3.6) 
Log (Nominal 
Exchange Rate) 
 
-- -- -.002 
(-1.9) 
-.002 
(-1.7) 
.0001 
(0.1) 
.001 
(0.5) 
-.003 
(-2.1) 
.004 
(2.7) 
X+M/GDP 
 
 
-- -- -.073 
(-7.2) 
-.066 
(-6.7) 
-.051 
(-5.1) 
-.050 
(-5.0) 
-.074 
(-6.0) 
-.049 
(-3.3) 
Relative Price 
 
 
-- -- -- .004 
(1.5) 
.002 
(1.0) 
.001 
(0.3) 
.002 
(0.8) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Crisis 
 
 
-- -- -- -.019 
(-4.5) 
-.019 
(-4.8) 
-.019 
(-4.8) 
-.027 
(-5.3) 
-.013 
(-1.9) 
Inward DFI 
 
-- -- -- -- -.153 
(-0.9) 
-.192 
(-1.2) 
.539 
(1.6) 
-.042 
(-0.3) 
Outward DFI 
 
-- -- -- -- 0.072 
(0.6) 
0.022 
(0.2) 
13.996 
(2.7) 
-.119 
(-1.0) 
Inward  
Remittances 
-- -- -- -- 2.094 
(0.9) 
1.471 
(0.6) 
-1.310 
(-0.4) 
2.965 
(1.1) 
Outward 
Remittances 
-- -- -- -- -5.817 
(-5.043) 
-5.740 
(-5.1) 
37.833 
(3.5) 
-6.996 
(-6.0) 
Government 
Spending/GDP 
-- -- -- -- .401 
(7.0) 
.468 
(7.8)  
.515 
(6.3) 
.507 
(5.5) 
GDP Growth 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -.068 
(-2.7) 
-.034 
(-1.3) 
-.105 
(-1.9) 
Inflation -- -- -- -- -- -.766 
(-1.9) 
-.112 
(-0.3) 
.349 
(3.9) 
N 1608 1238 1229 1229 1227 1192 494 698 
R-Square .91 .93 .93 .93 .94 .94 .94 .91 
 
 
Notes: T-statistics in ().  Estimation allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  All estimates include time and 
country dummies.  Dependent variable is labor share, defined as wages and compensation divided by GDP. 
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Table 4  
 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Below 
Median Per 
Capita 
GDP in 
1985 
(8) 
Above 
Median Per 
Capita GDP 
in 1985 
 
Log (L/K) 
 
 
-.107 
(-10.7) 
-.126 
(-7.9) 
-.110 
(-6.8) 
-.113 
(-6.0) 
-.104 
(-6.4) 
-.075 
(-2.1) 
-.031 
(-0.8) 
-.137 
(-5.4) 
Capital Controls 
 
 
-- .003 
(1.8) 
.002 
(1.5) 
.003 
(1.8) 
.004 
(2.7) 
.003 
(1.4) 
.002 
(0.4) 
.0003 
(0.2) 
Relative GDP 
Per Capita 
 
-- -.129 
(-1.2) 
.020 
(0.2) 
-.026 
(-0.2) 
.094 
(0.9) 
-0.242 
(-1.1) 
.016 
(0.1) 
-.640 
(-2.8) 
Log (Nominal 
Exchange Rate) 
 
-- -- -.001 
(-1.0) 
-.001 
(-1.2) 
.0004 
(0.3) 
.003 
(0.9) 
-.006 
(-2.2) 
.008 
(4.4) 
X+M/GDP 
 
 
-- -- -.075 
(-4.9) 
-.084 
(-5.5) 
-.054 
(-3.2) 
-.019 
(-0.6) 
-.065 
(-2.1) 
.034 
(1.2) 
Relative Price 
 
 
.004 
(1.9) 
.005 
(1.9) 
.005 
(1.7) 
 
.005 
(1.8) 
.004 
(1.4) 
-.004 
(-0.4) 
.000 
(0.0) 
0.001 
(0.4) 
Crisis 
 
 
-- -- -- -.017 
(-3.7) 
-.018 
(-4.2) 
-.030 
(-2.9) 
-.041 
(-4.0) 
-.028 
(-2.5) 
Inward DFI 
 
-- -- -- -- -.327 
(-1.2) 
-.477 
(-1.4) 
9.926 
(0.8) 
-.343 
(-1.1) 
Outward DFI 
 
-- -- -- -- 0.078 
(0.5) 
-.165 
(-0.6) 
41.248 
(0.8) 
-.340 
(-2.3) 
Inward  
Remittances 
-- -- -- -- 3.535 
(0.9) 
2.071 
(0.6) 
-.851 
(-0.1) 
-1.417 
(-0.3) 
Outward 
Remittances 
-- -- -- -- -5.902 
(-4.0) 
-6.052 
(-3.9) 
45.403 
(1.4) 
-7.744 
(-4.8) 
Government 
Spending/GDP 
-- -- -- -- .360 
(3.9) 
.291 
(2.5)  
.418 
(2.0) 
.314 
(2.4) 
GDP Growth 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -.468 
(-1.4) 
-.405 
(-2.2) 
-.568 
(-2.9) 
Inflation -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 
(0.0) 
-.867 
(0.0) 
.000 
(0.0) 
N 1375 1009 1009 1009 1008 977 392 585 
R-Square .92 .93 .93 .94 .94 .93 .92 .89 
 
Notes: T-statistics in ().  Estimation allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  All estimates include time and country dummies. 
Dependent variable is labor share, defined as wages and compensation divided by GDP. The relative price, the two exchange rate 
variables, and lagged relative GDP per capita are assumed to be exogenous; all other variables are instrumented with first and 
second lags, as well as with the country’s terms of trade, defined as the export price divided by the average import price. 
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Table 5  
Extensions on the IV Estimation 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Labor Share 
Includes Self-Employment 
 
Adding 
Interaction of 
Trade  with 
log(L/K) 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
 
(5) 
IV 
Log (L/K) 
 
-.063 
(-2.8) 
-.065 
(-3.0) 
-.054 
(-2.1) 
-.060 
(-2.2) 
-.104 
(-6.4) 
Capital Controls 
 
.008 
(4.2) 
.007 
(4.3) 
.008 
(3.0) 
.006 
(2.1) 
.004 
(2.7) 
Relative GDP 
Per Capita 
-.547 
(-2.0) 
-.630 
(-2.3) 
-.652 
(-2.2) 
-.842 
(-2.4) 
.095 
(0.9) 
Log (Nominal 
Ex Rate) 
-.004 
(0.9) 
0.000 
(0.0) 
.002 
(0.3) 
.008 
(1.3) 
.0004 
(0.3) 
X+M/GDP 
 
-.113 
(-6.4) 
-.082 
(-4.4) 
-.088 
(-3.0) 
-.065 
(-1.6) 
-.055 
(-0.7) 
Relative Price 
 
.001 
(0.3) 
.001 
(0.3) 
-.004 
(-0.9) 
-.003 
(-0.7) 
.004 
(1.3) 
Crisis 
 
-.008 
(1.3) 
.000 
(0.0) 
.011 
(1.5) 
-.009 
(-0.7) 
0.018 
(-4.2) 
Inward DFI 
 
.752 
(4.0) 
0.719 
(3.9) 
1.004 
(3.0) 
.791 
(2.2) 
-.332 
(-1.2) 
Outward DFI 
 
-.187 
(-1.5) 
-.167 
(-1.4) 
-.010 
(-0.1) 
-.281 
(-1.7) 
.079 
(0.5) 
Inward 
Remittances 
8.367 
(1.8) 
9.764 
(2.5) 
7.546 
(1.4) 
11.093 
(2.3) 
3.492 
(0.8) 
Outward 
Remittances 
-2.496 
(-2.1) 
-2.364 
(-2.1) 
-1.384 
(-0.7) 
-2.805 
(-1.5) 
-5.928 
(-4.1) 
Government 
Spending/GDP 
.270 
(2.2) 
.167 
(1.4) 
.063 
(0.4) 
.107 
(0.9) 
.359 
(3.9) 
GDP Growth 
 
-- -.184 
(-3.5) 
-- -.457 
(-1.8) 
-- 
Inflation 
 
-- .0001 
(8.8) 
-- .0001 
(3.2) 
-- 
Log(L/K)* 
(X+M/GDP) 
-- -- -- -- -.0001 
(0.0) 
N 358 356 323 320 1008 
R-Square .87 .89 .85 .87 .94 
 
T-statistics in ().  Estimation allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  All estimates include time and country dummies. Dependent 
variable is labor share, defined as wages and compensation divided by GDP. The only exception is column (2), where the 
dependent variable is labor compensation plus self-employment, divided by GDP.  The relative price, the two exchange rate 
variables, and relative GDP per capita are assumed to be exogenous; all other variables are instrumented with first and second 
lags. 
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Table 6  
 
Five Year Averages and Long Differences: OLS Estimation 
 
 Long Differences Five-Year Averages 
Independent 
Variables 
 
(1) (7) 
Below 
Median 
Per 
Capita 
GDP in 
1985 
(8) 
Above 
Median 
Per 
Capita 
GDP in 
1985 
(4) (5)  (6) 
Below 
Median Per 
Capita GDP 
in 1985 
(7) 
Above Median Per 
Capita GDP in 1985 
 
Log (L/K) 
 
 
-.075 
(-2.6) 
-.044 
(-0.7) 
-.075 
(-1.8) 
-.114 
(-3.9) 
-.123 
(-3.8) 
-.107 
(-2.6) 
-.128 
(-3.0) 
Capital Controls 
 
 
.006 
(0.8) 
-.003 
(-0.7) 
.009 
(0.8) 
.006 
(1.8) 
.004 
(1.4) 
.003 
(0.5) 
.002 
(0.5) 
Relative GDP 
Per Capita 
 
.559 
(-1.6) 
-.240 
(-0.8) 
-1.070 
(-2.8) 
0.090 
(0.5) 
-.175 
(-0.9) 
.341 
(1.0) 
-0.053 
(-0.2) 
Log (Nominal 
Exchange Rate) 
 
-.003 
(-1.4) 
-.007 
(-5.8) 
-.009 
(-1.7) 
0.001 
(0.4) 
0.001 
(0.3) 
-.003 
(-1.7) 
0.007 
(2.2) 
X+M/GDP 
 
 
-.011 
(-0.2) 
-.131 
(-4.9) 
0.169 
(2.1) 
-.054 
(-2.0) 
-.041 
(-1.4) 
-.066 
(-1.7) 
-.021 
(-0.5) 
Relative Price 
 
 
-.001 
(-0.3) 
0.008 
(1.5) 
-.0001 
(0.0) 
.008 
(1.5) 
.008 
(1.3) 
.009 
(1.9) 
.007 
(0.7) 
Crisis 
 
-.057 
(-1.8) 
-.057 
(-3.0) 
0.051 
(0.6) 
-.034 
(-2.6) 
-.036 
(-2.7) 
-.069 
(-4.5) 
-.018 
(-0.8) 
Inward DFI 
 
-5.312 
(-2.8) 
108.141
(2.3) 
-8.497 
(-2.8) 
-.227 
(-0.5) 
-.383 
(-0.7) 
-3.547 
(-0.7) 
-.154 
(-0.3) 
Outward DFI 
 
-1.580 
(-1.1) 
347.616 
(2.3) 
-4.927 
(-1.9) 
-.195 
(-0.7) 
-.066 
(-0.2) 
16.136 
(1.3) 
-.348 
(-1.2) 
Inward Remittances 
 
-1.156 
(-0.1) 
10.450 
(0.5) 
2.641 
(0.2) 
7.612 
(0.9) 
7.217 
(0.8) 
30.078 
(1.9) 
4.367 
(0.4) 
Outward Remittances 
 
-25.008 
(-4.7) 
13.950 
(0.1) 
-30.910 
(-4.0) 
-6.049 
(-2.6) 
-.066 
(-0.2) 
53.527 
(1.0) 
-7.237 
(-2.9) 
Government 
Spending/GDP 
.301 
(1.3) 
-.177 
(-1.3) 
.498 
(4.0) 
.550 
(4.3) 
.434 
(2.8) 
.683 
(3.5) 
.536 
(3.1) 
GDP Growth 
 
-- -- -- -- -.184 
(-1.9) 
-- -- 
Inflation 
 
-- -- -- -- .582 
(0.6) 
-- -- 
N 46 26 20 238 235 100 138 
R-Square .55 .77 .92 .96 .96 .97 .92 
 
 
Notes: T-statistics in ().  Estimation allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Dependent variable is labor share, defined as wages 
and compensation divided by GDP. 
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 Table 7  
 
 
Explaining Changes In 
Labor’s Share, 1990-
2004 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Change in Sample Mean, 1960- 1989 
to 1990-2004 
 
Estimated Coefficient 
 
 
 
Effect on Labor Share, 
Change from earlier 
period to current period 
 
 
Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor  Rich 
Log (L/K) 
 
 
-.236 -.347 -.014 
(-1.5) 
-.088 
(-12.9) 
.005 .031 
Capital Controls 
(out of 1) 
 
-.09 -.29 .0.0 
(0.0) 
.009 
(2.8) 
0.0 -.002 
       
Capital Inflows 
(as % of GDP) 
-.67 9.12 0.0 
(0.0) 
-.0003 
(-3.4) 
0.0 -.003 
X+M/GDP 
(as % of GDP) 
 
 
11.5 14.2 -.0001 
(-0.7) 
-.0005 
(-4.0) 
-.007 -.003 
Crisis 
(out of 1) 
 
.102 -.04 -.021 
(-3.5) 
-.010 
(-2.2) 
-.002 -.0004 
Inflation   -.041 
(-3.4) 
-.011 
(-1.0) 
  
Government 
Spending/GDP 
1.4 -1.9 .003 
(4.8) 
.002 
(5.3) 
.004 -.004 
 
Notes: Poor defined as below median GDP per capita.  Rich defined as above median GDP per capita.   
Change in sample mean calculated by first calculating within country means during 1960-1989 and 1990-2004, taking 
within country changes in means and then reporting the averages across rich and poor countries.. 
        
 
Figure 1: Trends in Labor Compensation/GDP (lshgol)  
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Figure  2: Trends in Labor Compensation/GDP (lshol): Lower Middle Income 
Countries
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Figure  3: Trends in Labor Compensation/GDP (lshgol) 
Midddle Income Countries 
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Figure  4: Trends in Labor Compensation/GDP (lshgol) 
Upper Income Countries  
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Figure  5: Trends in Labor Share: Labor Share defined as (Labor Compensation + Self-Employment Income)/GDP 
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Figure  6: Trends in Corporate Tax Rates 
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Top Figure shows the distribution of labor’s share including self-
employment, across all countries and years.  Bottom Figure shows the distribution of labor’s share excluding self-employment, across all countries and years 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1  - Trends in Labor Share (Reported Coefficient on Time) 
       
 
 
 
 
Labor Share Defined as 
Employee Compensation/GDP 
 
Labor Share Defined as 
Employee Compensation 
Divided by Nat'l Income 
 
Labor Share Defined as Employee
Compensation Plus Self-Employed
Income Divided by GDP 
COUNTRY coefficient t.value coefficient t.value coefficient t.value 
       
Albania 0.0066 6.36 * * * * 
Algeria 0.0033 3.02 0.0054 4.41 * * 
Angola -0.0098 -1.18 -0.0017 -0.22 * * 
Australia -0.0004 -1.31 0.0009 2.42 0.0018 -9.42 
Austria 0.0023 13.53 0.0028 15.48 * * 
Azerbaijan -0.0607 -9.05 -0.0705 -9.68 -0.0340 -4.51 
Bahrain 0.0093 5.90 0.4312 8.61 * * 
Belarus 0.0005 0.08 * * 0.0106 1.46 
Belgium 0.0017 3.14 0.0020 3.25 -0.0034 -8.75 
Belize -0.0007 -1.80 -0.0337 -3.64 * * 
Benin -0.0034 -5.63 -0.0042 -6.79 * * 
Bhutan -0.0051 -14.74 -0.0138 -4.64 * * 
Bolivia -0.0011 -2.00 -0.0015 -2.59 0.0097 1.07 
Botswana -0.0036 -3.06 -0.0054 -1.72 -0.0231 -17.59 
Brit. Virgin Islands -0.0107 -10.47 -0.0166 5.43 * * 
Bulgaria -0.0033 -1.73 -0.0253 -1.39 0.0282 1.20 
Burkina Faso 0.0063 4.05 0.0120 * * * 
Burundi -0.0120 -1.27 0.0049 4.01 -0.0094 -3.29 
Cameroon 0.0021 3.90 0.0020 2.44 * * 
Canada 0.0013 7.34 0.0020 9.72 * * 
Cayman Islands 0.0031 1.49 -0.0032 -1.65 * * 
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Chile -0.0018 -3.42 0.0019 2.10 * * 
China/Hong Kong -0.0004 -0.52 * * * * 
Colombia 0.0012 3.31 0.0002 0.72 -0.0029 -1.83 
Congo -0.0070 -3.94 -0.0027 -0.74 0.0088 0.76 
Costa Rica 0.0003 1.07 0.0007 3.17 * * 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0005 1.00 0.0024 1.19 -0.0109 -2.24 
Denmark 0.0002 0.55 0.0026 5.07 * * 
Djibouti 0.0059 0.75 0.0167 2.94 * * 
Ecuador -0.0021 -3.51 -0.0078 -7.67 -0.0017 -1.20 
Estonia 0.0041 2.63 -0.0014 -0.36 * * 
Fiji -0.0015 -0.98 -0.0014 -0.82 * * 
Finland 0.0020 3.84 0.0042 6.52 -0.0020 -5.28 
Former Federal 
Republic of Yemen 
 
0.0104 2.61 0.0018 0.65 * * 
France 0.0000 -0.08 0.0010 1.41 -0.0017 -6.37 
French Guyana -0.0109 -5.14 -0.0094 -6.69 * * 
French Polynesia -0.0105 -10.44 * * * * 
Gabon 0.0027 0.86 0.0053 1.01 * * 
Germany -0.0058 -4.10 0.0026 -1.64 * * 
German Democratic 
Republic 
 
0.0019 4.24 0.0029 5.63 * * 
Greece 0.0036 9.33 0.0048 10.03 * * 
Guadeloupe 0.0106 18.20 * * * * 
Guyana -0.0091 -3.43 0.0021 0.57 * * 
Honduras -0.0012 -1.21 0.0009 0.07 * * 
Hungary 0.0059 3.95 * * 0.0117 7.44 
Iceland -0.0015 -4.21 -0.0013 -3.82 * * 
Indonesia 0.0007 0.23 -0.0034 -2.85 * * 
Ireland -0.0032 -3.98 0.0013 1.23 * * 
Israel 0.0015 7.54 0.0037 11.03 * * 
Italy -0.0008 -1.90 0.0002 0.32 -0.0041 -12.46 
Jamaica -0.0052 -3.25 -0.0033 -2.62 -0.0152 -5.29 
Japan 0.0048 13.81 0.0058 15.15 0.0006 2.67 
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Jordan 0.0022 6.72 0.0037 14.82 * * 
Kazakhstan -0.0013 -2.09 * * * * 
Kenya * * -0.0011 -1.79 * * 
Kuwait 0.0149 5.33 0.0127 7.64 * * 
Kyrgyzstan 0.0339 -2.93 -0.0420 0.02 0.0211 1.40 
Latvia 0.0071 0.75 0.0176 1.32 0.0212 2.06 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahirya 
 
0.0060 2.89 0.0039 1.43 * * 
Lithuania -0.0044 -3.53 0.0064 2.40 * * 
Luxembourg 0.0037 6.30 -0.0002 -0.38 * * 
Malawi -0.0031 -5.19 -0.0023 -1.85 * * 
Malaysia -0.0022 -2.96 -0.0019 -2.37 * * 
Mali 0.0058 5.14 0.0140 * * * 
Malta -0.0015 -7.14 -0.0011 0.00 -0.0040 -5.62 
Martinique 0.0064 7.42 * * * * 
Mauritius -0.0031 -7.05 -0.0027 -4.64 * * 
Mexico -0.0034 -4.33 -0.0022 -3.04 * * 
Mongolia 0.0216 6.99 0.0161 2.47 * * 
Morocco 0.0000 -0.01 0.0008 0.65 * * 
Mozambique 0.0177 4.51 0.0113 2.92 * * 
Myanmar -0.0057 -0.86 0.0011 1.92 * * 
Namibia -0.0020 -0.89 -0.0135 -3.46 * * 
Nepal -0.0060 -3.42 -0.0020 -0.96 * * 
Netherlands -0.0025 -5.27 -0.0016 -2.64 -0.0035 -7.81 
Netherlands Antilles -0.0063 -2.47 -0.0006 -0.24 * * 
New Zealand -0.0034 -4.37 -0.0019 -2.20 * * 
New Caledonia 0.0010 0.50 * * * * 
Nicaragua 0.0026 3.10 0.0026 3.39 * * 
Niger -0.0016 -0.51 0.0002 0.05 * * 
Nigeria -0.0081 -7.10 -0.0072 -5.89 * * 
Norway -0.0013 -3.11 -0.0002 -0.35 -0.0056 -0.57 
Oman -0.0012 -0.22 * * * * 
Pakistan -0.0008 -2.73 0.0002 0.19 * * 
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Panama -0.0050 -10.81 -0.0026 -3.03 * * 
Papua New Guinea -0.0034 -3.17 -0.0029 -2.37 * * 
Paraguay -0.0026 -6.32 -0.0026 -5.67 * * 
Peru -0.0069 -6.82 -0.0062 -7.67 * * 
Philippines 0.0010 1.75 0.0002 0.62 -0.0082 -11.19 
Portugal -0.0031 -2.87 -0.0017 -1.53 -0.0010 -0.66 
Puerto Rico -0.0022 -7.09 0.0049 12.57 * * 
Rep of Korea 0.0053 20.33 0.0067 24.37 -0.0033 -13.04 
Reunion 0.0014 0.95 -0.0039 -5.13 -0.0056 -7.64 
Romania -0.0182 -6.71 -0.0425 -3.71 * * 
Russian Federation -0.0259 -3.19 -0.0242 -1.38 * * 
Rwanda 0.0077 8.51 0.0093 9.06 * * 
Saudi Arabia 0.0135 8.54 0.0123 6.36 * * 
Senegal 0.0130 7.53 0.0124 6.01 * * 
Seychelles 0.0000 0.01 0.0012 1.15 * * 
Sierra Leone -0.0063 -6.73 -0.0073 -6.43 * * 
Singapore 0.0015 1.79 -0.0012 -1.19 * * 
Slovakia -0.0096 -1.54 * * * * 
Slovenia 0.0040 2.01 * * * * 
Solomon Islands 0.0112 3.84 0.0157 4.82 * * 
South Africa 0.0001 1.08 0.0007 3.18 * * 
Spain -0.0010 -1.77 -0.0004 -0.69 * * 
Sri Lanka 0.0014 3.99 0.0018 2.31 * * 
St. Pierre -0.0119 -5.98 * * * * 
Suriname 0.0003 0.11 -0.0016 -0.56 * * 
Swaziland 0.0015 2.06 * * * * 
Sweden -0.0009 -1.43 0.0018 2.28 -0.0021 -4.32 
Switzerland 0.0032 20.98 0.0042 21.92 * * 
Thailand 0.0032 11.80 0.0043 12.92 * * 
Togo -0.0028 -2.07 -0.0018 -1.13 * * 
Tonga 0.0003 0.06 -0.0013 -0.22 * * 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0022 1.91 0.0027 1.77 * * 
Tunisia -0.0043 -11.00 -0.0027 -7.76 * * 
 50
Turkey -0.0011 -1.40 -0.0009 -1.03 * * 
Ukraine -0.0166 -2.21 -0.0193 -1.74 -0.0196 -1.57 
United Arab Emirates 
 
0.0063 4.02 0.0067 2.82 * * 
United Kingdom -0.0015 -7.58 -0.0007 -2.53 -0.0004 -1.79 
United Rep Tanzania 
 
-0.0086 -11.10 -0.0086 -11.23 * * 
United States 0.0007 4.84 0.0015 8.34 0.0000 -0.02 
Uruguay -0.0028 -3.80 -0.0028 -3.93 * * 
Vanuatu 0.0012 0.54 -0.0012 -0.31 * * 
Venezuela -0.0046 -4.45 -0.0053 -4.54 * * 
Yemen -0.0032 -0.87 0.0212 3.34 * * 
Zaire 0.0198 5.53 0.0194 5.70 * * 
Zambia -0.0057 -1.72 -0.0031 -0.91 * * 
Zimbabwe 0.0000 0.00 0.0007 0.60 * * 
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